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Thesis: The education received in madrassas located in Pakistan is contributing to the Taliban’s
resurgence in Afghanistan.
I. Introduction of terms
A. Significance of topic
B. Definition of terms
1. The Taliban
2. Madrassas
C. Statement of thesis
II. Laying the foundations for resurgence
A. Pre- September 11, 2001
1. Soviet invasion and destruction of Afghanistan
2.Afghan refugees going to madrassas in Pakistan
3. Education in Pakistan and foreign funding
4.Wahhabi, and Deobandi influence in madrassas
5.Students from madrassas returning to Afghanistan and form the Taliban
B. Post- September 11, 2001 and Operation Enduring Freedom
1.Taliban expelled from Afghanistan
2. Taliban resurgence in the war in Afghanistan
III. Madrassa education nurturing Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan
A. Madrassa curriculum and Taliban ideology
1. Indoctrination
2. Military training
B. Taliban legitimized among the youth
1. Breakdown of the tribal system in Afghanistan and inefficiencies of
Karzai government
2. Personal fulfillment through membership in the Taliban
C. Recruiting methods of the Taliban in madrassas
D. Madrassas in Pakistan give new life to the Taliban’s insurgency
IV. Conclusion
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On July 23, 2009 Cpl. Nicholas G. Xiarhos1 was on a mission in Afghanistan2 when a blast
went off under his humvee. Cpl. Xiarhos died soon after the explosion. The incident occurred
five years after former United States (U.S.) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared
victory in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).3 However, on August 10, 2009, General Stanley
McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said that the Taliban has gained the upper
hand over the OEF and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) (Dreazen).4 Throughout
2009, cases like Cpl. Xiarhos’ have become more frequent as the Taliban has enjoyed a new
resurgence (Hickey).5 Many have speculated why the Taliban, a strict Islamist movement that
governed Afghanistan from 1994 until 2001, has re-emerged as a potent enemy. Experts have
hypothesized that Pakistani madrassas,6 Islamic religious school at the primary and secondary
level of education for males,7 have become fertile recruiting grounds for the Taliban and promote
Islamic fundamentalist militant ideology. The education received in madrassas located in
Pakistan is contributing to the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan.
The Taliban insurgency has sprung from a long timeline of conflict within Afghanistan. The
current population in Afghanistan has rarely seen a day without conflict caused by war.8 In
modern history the most devastating conflict in Afghanistan was the Soviet Union led invasion
lasting from December 27, 1979 to February 15, 1989.9 Over 5 million Afghans fled the country
as a result of the Soviet Union’s invasion. A majority of these refugees sought protection in
Pakistan (Ruiz).
Pakistan has been a country traditionally marked by extreme poverty, and education has often
taken a back seat to other issues. Students who wish to attend public school must pay a
substantial tuition. The government often cannot compete with madrassas because of their free
education. Madrassas are appealing alternatives for poor families who wish their children to
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receive an education or to provide a safe place for children to grow up. Many Muslim families
perceive the religious education in madrassas to be of better quality than the secular education
taught in Pakistani public schools. Madrassas, unlike the public schools, can often guarantee
employment after graduation for their students.10 Throughout the duration of the War in
Afghanistan, the government of Pakistan has made efforts to regulate its madrassas, such as
requesting madrassas to register and conform to government standards. This has been part of an
effort by the government in Pakistan to protect against violent extremist like the Taliban.
However, in many cases the Pakistan government has often lacked the ability to maintain their
regulations.11
Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam that calls for charitable giving,12 has been a major
factor behind the funding of madrassas in Pakistan. While there are no published reports that link
charitable giving from Gulf States, such as Saudi Arabia, (Blanchard 2004) to the madrassas in
Pakistan some critics have alleged that these governments have long encouraged this practice
(Simpson). For example, classrooms at Darul Uloom Haqqania have small inscriptions informing
visitors that Saudi Arabia donated the building materials (Haqqani).13 Saudi Wahhabism has
been a major influence over the ideologies held by the Taliban and the teachings in madrassas.14
One expert estimates charitable donations funneled from Saudi Arabia to education in Pakistan at
around $3 billion to $4 billion annually (Winer). Through zakat donations both ideas and
monetary exchanges have floated into the Pakistani madrassas. Therefore countries like Saudi
Arabia have had a large amount of influence over the madrassas where they donate.
The madrassas being used to train and recruit Taliban fighters stem from an institution of
Islamic learning that dates back to the eleventh century. Like madrassas worldwide, those in
Pakistan offer a religious based curriculum focusing on the Quran and Islamic texts. A typical
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curriculum consists of twenty subjects (Ahmad) divided into the “revealed sciences’ and
‘rational sciences” based on the Dars-i-Nizami curriculum (Haqqani).15 The Dars-i-Nizami
curriculum is a method of teaching that has been used since the eighteenth century, and that
tends to be associated with Islamist beliefs of Islam. A typical madrassas goal is to teach their
students an Islamic education and make them a productive member of the ulema.
Unlike traditional madrassas, those in Pakistan have developed an association with militancy
and terrorism.16 Some say that these madrassas have evolved into promoting radicalized forms of
Islam that teach Muslim students to fight nonbelievers and stand against what they see as the
moral depravity of the West (Haqqani). Madrassas in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region
were established during the 1980s with the particular purpose of fighting against the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan (Ahmad). A special interpretation of Islam called Deobandi, that fuels
these associations, is taught at these concerning Pakistani madrassas.17 The Deobandi
interpretation of Islam calls for an Islamist interpretation of Islam and is highly skeptical of the
West. Deobandi madrassas are the ones most closely allied to the Taliban.
The same madrassas that are now the source of the Taliban resurgence were also the birth
place of the Taliban movement in the 1990s. Mullah Mohammad Omar,18 along with ninety
percent of the Taliban leadership, had been a student at Darul Uloom Haqqania. The Taliban,
who were mainly Afghan refugees, arose as a group wishing to be a solution to Afghanistan’s
instability. These individuals were from a generation who had never seen their country at peace.
The Taliban members had no memories of their tribes, their elders, their neighbors or the
complex ethnic mix of peoples that made up their villages and their homeland. Instead of holding
on to the traditions of Afghanistan’s tribal system, the Taliban with their theological
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indoctrination and military training received in Pakistani madrassa embraced a new Islamist
vision for Afghanistan.
In the early 1990s after the Soviet Union withdrew Afghanistan was in anarchy. By 1994,
the Taliban gathered enough strength to capture the city of Kandahar.19 They were able to
occupy Kabul by September 1996. By the end of 1998, the Taliban occupied 90 percent of the
country. Once gaining a substantial control of Afghanistan, the Taliban installed a new Islamist
vision for the country. Under their leadership, a strict interpretation of Sharia Law, advocated by
the Islamic interpretation of Deobandi, was installed as the governing structure of Taliban
occupied Afghanistan. Despite the criticism the Taliban received for human rights, the citizens of
Afghanistan were relieved to finally have some sense of stability. U.S. Senator Hank Brown
stated: “The good part of what has happened is that one of the fractions at last seems capable of
developing a new government in Afghanistan” (A. Rashid 2001).20 Another U.S. diplomat in
1997 said: “The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis. There will be Aramco …,
pipelines, an emir, no parliament and lots of Sharia law. We can live with that” (A. Rashid
2001).
However, the Taliban formed a coalition with al Qaeda, a terrorist organization. Under
the Taliban’s protection, al Qaeda operated terrorist camps and planned worldwide attacks. On
September 11, 2001, al Qaeda attacked the U.S which resulted in the destruction of the World
Trade Center and part of the Pentagon building, and the death of 2,975 individuals (AP). On
October 7, 2001, the U.S. aided by the United Kingdom, Canada and NATO coalition forces,
began military actions in Afghanistan that ousted the Taliban from leadership. By early
December of 2001 the Taliban lost their last stronghold in Kandahar.
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Nevertheless, despite what many officials believed, the Taliban was far from a defeated
enemy.21 After the Taliban had been expelled from Afghanistan they sought sanctuary in
Pakistan. Quickly, the Taliban established a presence and stronghold in areas of the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.22
The Taliban also stationed itself in three main Pakistan cities (Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi)
and created an “inner shura”23 that is divided into “a series of functional committees: military,
propaganda, finance, religious, political, and administrative” (Jones 30). Quetta is headquarters
for “the political, military, and religious committees”, Peshawar is the Taliban’s base for their
“propaganda and media committees,” and Karachi is home to the “the Taliban’s financial base”
(Jones 30).24
In all three of the Taliban’s main cities of operations in Pakistani madrassas have
provided safe havens for the Taliban’s organization. The Taliban has gained a strong amount of
influence in education in these areas. The final report produced by the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) cited “poor education” in Pakistan
as “a particular concern” (9/11 Commission). Madrassas in Pakistan were singled out as “actual
or potential terrorist sanctuaries” that are being used by the Taliban “as incubators for violent
extremism” (9/11 Commission). The U.S. Department of State’s annual report for religious
freedom from 2007 concluded that madrassas in Pakistan were important for the Taliban’s regrouping and new recruitment. The report found that madrassas are teaching, “extremist doctrine
in support of terrorism” (United States Department of State).25 As of 2008, Pakistan hosts an
estimated 12,000 madrassas (Blanchard, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrassas: Background,
2008) with an estimated 1.7 to 1.9 million students in total (Candland).26 Fifteen percent of these
madrassas have some type of connection to the Taliban (Johnston). Thus, according to these
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statistics nearly 300,000 young individuals are possible recruits for the Taliban insurgency in
Afghanistan. In comparison, as of 2009, only 87,000 combined OEF and ISAF coalition forces
are in Afghanistan (DeYoung). OEF and ISAF have underestimated the strategic and ideological
capabilities of the Taliban through their connection to Pakistani madrassas.
The madrassa system’s strength is being reinforced by a negative correlation that is
undermining the leadership in Afghanistan’s tribal system and central government by an increase
influence of religious authorities. Religious leaders, such as Mullahs,27 are highly respected in
both Pakistan and Afghanistan. These religious leaders try to trump the authority of the tribal
system and central government. Mullahs have a large amount of influence over social and
political affairs. In Afghanistan and the sections of Pakistan that the Taliban has infiltrated, the
majority of the population is illiterate and villages are isolated from the outside world. Mullahs
are often the most trusted source of information. The United States Agency of International
Development (USAID) concluded that “extremism is more likely to flourish where governments
are too weak politically to risk alienating radical Islamic leaders, and are therefore less inclined
to take strong actions against extremist groups” (USAID). Majorities of the Taliban leadership
are Mullahs and Mullahs are also the teachers at the Pakistani madrassas that are of concern.
Mullahs at these Pakistani madrassas have been teaching a radicalized curriculum that
combines indoctrination and military training. Some believe that the emphasis in these madrassas
has been shifted away “from the standard pillars of faith” and has focused on “the obligation and
rewards of violent jihad” (Kapisthalam).28 Students are taught to achieve a utopian state through
any means necessary. Some syllabi indicate that teachers go “to great lengths to make students
aware of Western domination, the exploitative potential of Western political and economic ideas,
and the disruptive influence of Western liberty and individualism on Muslim societies” (Rahman
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313). For example, students are told that the events of September 11, 2001 were not conducted
by al Qaeda but were a conspiracy between the U.S. and Jews against the Muslim world
(Haqqani 61).
Most madrassa instructors will never admit to coercing their students into joining the
Taliban.29 However, Muaulana Samiul Haq, headmaster of the Darul uloom Haqqania madrassa,
was quoted as saying, “Young minds are not for thinking. We catch them for the [madrassas]
when they are young, and by the time they are old enough to think, they know what to think”
(Haqqani 63). Lal Masjid’s madrassa is a rare case where the madrassas managers publically
support the Taliban and “encourage their students to join the anti-Western jihad in Afghanistan”
(Ahmad). At Darul uloom Haqqania’s commencement ceremony in 2003, “in their speeches,
teachers and religious scholars urged the students to put defending their faith before everything
else” (H. Rashid 2003). Even if the madrassas in Pakistan do not make militants, “they create a
worldview that makes militancy possible” (Tavernise). The mindset established by a madrassas
is that it “wants to stop music, girls’ schools and festival,” and “their message is that this is not
real life. Real life comes later – after death,” a social researcher in Southern Punjab claims
(Tavernise).30 Compared to other types of schools surveyed in Pakistan, madrassas and their
students were found to be the most intolerant.31 In these surveys, the madrassas are described as
“the most supportive of an aggressive foreign policy, the most intolerant of religious minorities,
and do not support equal rights for men and women” (Rahman 313).
Support for the Taliban in madrassas is not only enforced by the indoctrination but also
by the provision of military training. Some have called these madrassas “Islamic West Points”
for the Taliban. At a madrassa, the students become well versed in how to wage jihad. By the
time student’s graduate from a madrassa, they are knowledgeable in militant activities that can

Warren 10

be used to help support the Taliban’s insurgency. For example, students are taught how to use a
gun and build improvised explosive devices (IEDS). Madrassa students are taught how to
develop “or acquire new commercial communications gear and new field equipment” and given
“tactical, camouflage, and marksmanship training” (Jones 36). During the summer of 2009, ISAF
captured a madrassa in Khost, Afghanistan.32 At the madrassas, coalition forces found evidence
that a military training camp had been set-up at there. Coalition troops found an "array of
bunkers, tents and lean-to structures that indicated an active training site," ISAF reported.
Soldiers found materials to make roadside bombs, as well as assault rifles, RPGs, heavy machine
guns, hand grenades, and communications equipment at the site (Roggio). The madrassa was
known to be run by the Haqqani network which has a close affiliation with the Taliban.33
However, exact information about the details of military training that goes on in madrassas is
hard to come by because madrassas are secretive about their operations.
Madrassas have been historically known to be supported by the Pakistani Inter-Service
Intelligence (ISI).34 The ISI has helped in aiding military training to madrassas. While the ISI
cannot come out and directly support the Taliban’s insurgency in Afghanistan, the agency can
help Taliban recruits in Pakistani madrassas learn techniques that can benefit the Taliban on the
battle field in Afghanistan. Organizations like NATO, United Nations (UN), Afghan
government, and the Pakistan government have accused ISI of providing assistance to madrassas
and the Taliban’s insurgency, including providing “intelligence to Taliban insurgents at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels” (Jones 32).35 Sharing radical religious and political
views, ISI and the Taliban have been long term allies. Over the past year though, the relationship
between ISI and the Taliban has changed. The Taliban’s increasing threat to the security and
stability of Pakistan has caused ISI to question their alliance. However, as ISAF success in
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Afghanistan falters and the U.S. contemplates withdrawal ISI may still wish to maintain friendly
relations with the Taliban.
A combination of an education in madrassas that focuses on indoctrination and militancy
has led to a strong connection between the students and the Taliban but the politics taking place
in Afghanistan have influence as well. Before the Taliban’s government, tribal identity had been
at the center of Afghan identity for centuries. Where a strong central government had failed to
persist, tribes filled the gap by providing basic needs, security, culture, and socializations for
tribal members. Tribes have led to the creation and preservation of diversity among Afghans.
When the Taliban took over, their government was dominated by a new Islamist vision for
Afghanistan which undermined the tribal system. Young Afghans who attend madrassas in
Pakistan saw their tribal identities begun to blur or become unknown. Youth, like the members
who formed the Taliban, were educated out of their tribal basis in favor of a religious basis.
When the youth who had been educated in madrassas returned to their native Afghanistan they
were no longer accustomed to the tribal system. Instead of the Taliban government enforcing
tribal elders as a source of authority the Taliban placed themselves at the center of authority.
Following the fall of the Taliban, insecurities and a weak central government led by the
current president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, has furthered the undermining of the tribal
system.36 The Karzai government dominated by corruption and inefficiencies, has been unable to
fill the void left by the Taliban. Karzai’s government cannot provide the youth with security or
belonging.37 Social and economic inequalities have combined to produce an atmosphere of
despair among youth. One South Asia expert points out that the strongest “potential supporters”
of the Taliban are those who see no other opportunity for them after graduating from school due
to a “stagnant” economy and a “population” that is “growing out of control” (Peri 87). The
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Afghan central government’s philosophy, which advocates secularism, is one that is not easily
understandable to the youth of these madrassas because they are being educated in a religious
environment that is indifferent to secularism.
The Taliban appeals to the youth for two interlocking reasons. First, “the tribal system [in
Afghanistan] is in crisis and that it can no longer provide ‘peace, income, a sense of purpose, a
social network’ to the local youth” (Giustozzi 39), and the Karzai government has failed to
successfully replace the Taliban’s former government. Taliban insurgents are taking advantage
of the weak tribal and Karzai government structures by assuming state like functions. The
Taliban can “provide security, collect taxes, set up administrative structures, and seek to perform
other government functions for the population they control” (Jones 17). State building is at the
central of the Taliban’s insurgency. Seeing the governance failures of the tribal system and
Karzai’s government enforces much of the local Afghan population in rural areas outside of
Kabul to support the Taliban. Many locals believe the Taliban will return to governance of
Afghanistan once coalition forces leave. These beliefs legitimize the Taliban. If the Taliban will
regain to power in Afghanistan than that can be seen as the will of Allah, and will consequently
reinforces the Taliban’s goal to create a pure state of Islam.
The youth who are being educated in Pakistan have grown up in an environment where
the tribal system of Afghanistan is not socialized. Tribal identities for older generations raised in
Afghanistan matter significantly. For the youth being educated in Pakistani madrassas, a tribal
identity does not matter. Emphasis is placed on a person’s religious background in the Pakistani
madrassas, which then again reinforces communication with the Taliban because of the shared
Deobandi background. According to survey data “lower- and lower middle- class children are
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more likely to attend a madrassah than their wealthier counterparts” and “the highest [madrassas]
enrollment tends to be along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border” (Fair 62-3).
Secondly, being educated in the radicalized Deobandi Pakistani madrassas the youth
already hold many linking qualities to the Taliban (Ahmad). The Taliban, having adopted an
extreme version of Deobandi, and the youth sharing a Deobandi background likely plays an
increased role of homogeneity making political communication easier. For their insurgency, the
Taliban wants smart people to help with their cause and their recruitment has focused in on
educated individuals (Fair 55). A religious background is preferable for Taliban recruits.
Combined with the education and religious background madrassas students receive, they are
ideal Taliban recruits.
For young men coming out of madrassas, the Taliban offers a sense of adventure to rise
up against the evil Western invaders. Due to socioeconomic factors the Taliban is an appealing
job opportunity for madrassa graduates. The youth being impressionable and deprived of
opportunities are any easy prey for the Taliban wishing to propagate their ideological agendas
(Fair 56). In madrassas students are reinforced with the idea that Western countries are infidels
and are out to destroy Islam. The Taliban is seen as a heroic force out to stop the West’s
corruption of Islam. Young men are given the chance by fighting a noble fight with the Taliban
in honor of protecting their religion. By fighting with the Taliban these young men can become
martyrs for their religion and achieve happiness in the afterlife (Ali). These are the two reasons
why the Taliban has been appealing to the youth of the Pakistani madrassas.
In the past few years the Taliban insurgency has strengthened as a result of the recruits
coming out of the madrassas. Out of the roughly 300,000 possible Taliban recruits from
madrassas an estimate ten percent actually join the Taliban (Fair 25). The Taliban has run an
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extensive network within madrassas to recruit young men for their insurgency. OEF and ISAF
officials have noticed a notable increase in the Taliban’s size and capabilities over the years.
Taliban members that have been captured by coalition forces have been young fresh blood, and
received some type of religious education in a Pakistani madrassa. Even before graduating from
a madrassa the youth can be manipulated into aiding the Taliban militarily. The Taliban has been
known to use still enrolled madrassa students as suicide bombers. Police in the Punjab region of
Pakistan estimate around two thirds of the suicide bombers in that region have been educated in
madrassas (Tavernise). Studies of suicide terrorist “found that generally suicide terrorist tend to
have educational levels exceeding the societal man” (Fair 67).38
Not only are students supporting the Taliban militarily but they also help the Taliban by
gaining political connections that aid their insurgency. Madrassas have a tradition of holding
political significance through political parties. This connection between madrassas and political
parties has helped the Taliban to gain a greater footing in establishing an insurgency throughout
Afghanistan Many madrassa officials are ranking members of their national or provincial
chapters of religious parties. Their students serve as an important source of street power that can
be mobilized in the service of their political benefactors. There is evidence that links students to
involvement in demonstrations and rallies that aid the Taliban’s efforts in Afghanistan (Fair 65).
Madrassa students have military and political strength to their resurgence in Afghanistan.
There is a direct connection between Pakistani madrassas and the Taliban’s resurgence in
Afghanistan. Many of the madrassas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region promote an
education of indoctrination and military training that fosters a relationship between the Taliban
and students. Due to the madrassa education, the Taliban is legitimized among the students and
has become a prominent place for the Taliban to recruit within. Coalition forces have been
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abruptly taken aback by the Taliban’s increase in strength. Experts estimate that part of this
increase in strength has been from all the new recruits that the Taliban has received from
Pakistani madrassas. Madrassas in Pakistan have given new life to the Taliban’s insurgency in
Afghanistan. This madrassa and Taliban connection has broad implications for coalition forces
fighting in the War in Afghanistan. Rising casualties, like the death of Cpl. Xiarhos, are why the
connection between Pakistani madrassas and the Taliban is so important. The education received
in madrassas located in Pakistan is contributing to the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan.

Endnotes
1

Cpl. Nicholas G. Xiarhos was a member of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment

stationed in Afghanistan. On July 23, 2009 Cpl. Xiarhos, along with fellow comrades Cpl.
Trevor Paar, Cpl. Dominic Divila, and Lance Cpl. Jeremy S. Lasher, set out to recover a mineresistant vehicle that had become stuck in a canal earlier during the day. The four Marines were
returning from getting chains to tow the vehicle when a blast went off under their humvee. As a
result of the incident, both Cpl. Xiarhos and Lance Cpl. Lasher lost their lives. Cpl. Paar suffered
a severe head injury but survived. Cpl. Divila lost both of his legs and also survived. (Tyson)
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2

Please see Appendix A for a map of Afghanistan.

3

On May 1, 2003, a few hours before former U.S. President George W. Bush declared

“mission accomplished” in the War in Iraq, Rumsfeld held a press conference declaring that
major operations in the War in Afghanistan were over.
4

ISAF is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led security and development

mission in Afghanistan. It was established by the United Nations (UN) Security Council on
December 20, 2001 (Security Council Resolution 1386) as envisioned by the Bonn Agreement
under Annex I.
5

The total number of casualties in 2009 has been greater than 2001, 2002, 2003, and

2004 combined (York). Please see Appendix E for a chart that compares casualties in the War in
Afghanistan throughout the war’s eight years.
6

These experts include Hussain Haqqani, Antonio Giustozzi, Nasreen Akhatar, and

Mumtaz Ahmad.
7

Please see Appendix B for a map of Pakistan

8

Please see Appendix L for a detailed outline of conflict in Afghanistan.

9

The Soviet led invasion of Afghanistan was one of the worse catastrophes to the country

in modern history. This conflict resulted in a massive Afghan refugee crisis and a practically
nonexistent educational system in the country. During the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Afghanistan over 1 million Afghans were killed and another 5 million fled to Iran and Pakistan.
In the 1980s, one out of two refugees in the world was an Afghan (Ruiz). In the 1990s only 650
schools were set in place throughout the country for every student in the country (Afghanistan
Education).
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10

By the time a student graduates from a madrassa they are almost guaranteed

employment. Students are offered job opportunities in a variety of religious settings, like
mosques and madrassas. Graduates of madrassas are valuable comities to the Islamic faith and
employment in the religious sector is easy for them to find after graduation.
11

Before leaving power General Pervez Musharraf made many efforts to reform the

madrassa system in Pakistan to appease the U.S. In 2002, Musharraf’s government promised to
reform madrassas by prosecuting the ones that preach violence, pushing the remaining ones
towards moderation and integrating them into the public school system. By making these
initiatives Pakistan would comply with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 as an antiterrorism measure. Musharraf announced an initiative called the Deeni Madaris Ordinance
(Voluntary Registration and Regulation) of 2002, which aimed at dealing with the extremist
influence over madrassas. The reform of this ordinance included (1) a five year, $1 billion plan
introduced in 2003 aimed at including modern, secular subjects, such as mathematics, on syllabi
and bringing madrassas under scrutiny of the Education Ministry. (2) A USAID commitment of
$100 million to rehabilitate public schools. (3) A 2002 law requiring madrassas to audit their
funding and foreign students to register with the government. The number of foreign religious
students has since dropped from thousands to hundreds as the government has been issuing and
renewing fewer visas to religious students. (4) Established model madrassas that would provide
modern, useful education without promoting extremism.
However, many of Musharraf’s commitments to reforming the madrassa system failed.
Many madrassas simply refused to register with the government and remained at large within
Pakistan. No one knows exactly how many madrassas are located throughout Pakistan. Even
though the Pakistan Government claims to have stopped foreign students from attending school
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in Pakistan there is little evidence to support this claim. Students who have been refused a visa
can easily sneak over the Afghan-Pakistan border.
The new government of Pakistan, led by Asif Ali Zardari, has been faced with many of
the same difficulties Musharraf’s formed government encountered. Faced with perceived greater
problems and internal strife within Pakistan the new government has once again allowed the
priority of madrassa reform to appear near the end of its list. No new measures have been taken
to deal with the madrassa problem.
12

Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam. This pillar calls for the giving of a small

percentage of an individual’s surplus wealth to charity. Typically Zakat is distributed among
poor and needy Muslim individuals and causes. Zakat is namely distributed through
organizations and not directly given to the needy.
13

Darul Uloom Haqqania “one of the most popular [madrassas] (it includes most of the

Afghani Taliban leadership among its alumni) – has a student body of 1500 boarding students
and 1000 day students, from 6 years old upwards. Each year over 15,000 applicants from poor
families vie for its 400 open spaces” (Singer). Please see appendix D for a more detailed profile
on Darul Uloom Haqqania.
14

Wahhabism is a sect of Islam founded by Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, an 18th

century scholar from what is today known as Saudi Arabia, who advocated to purge Islam of
what he considered innovations in Islam. It is often referred to as a sect within Sunni Islam. It
has developed considerable influence in the Muslim world through the funding of mosques,
schools and other means from Persian Gulf oil wealth. The promotion of Wahhabi has been due
in large part to the government of Saudi Arabia (Murphy).
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15

Madrassas around the world follow a similar tradition as one another. In his book

Pervez Hoodbhoy describes the daily routine of a madrassa for students. He states:

A daily routine is generally among the following pattern. A day
starts with the Fajr prayers, followed by recitation of the Holy
Qur’an. Regular classes commence soon after breakfast and
continue until lunchtime. There are one or two classes after the
Zohr prayers. Some institutions allow a siesta period after that.
Students are allowed playtime of an hour or so after Asr prayers.
The Maghreb prayers are followed by a lesson and dinner. The
students are required to revise the day’s learning after the Isha
prayers before they go to bed around 11 p.m. (Hoodbhoy 230).
Students attending madrassas are said to be given modest meals. Hoodbhoy says the “students
live, study, and sleep on the floor together in the same hall” and the students pack “off their
bedding in a corner during the day” (Hoodbhoy 230). Teachers are described to have separate
quarters than the students.
There are a variety of subject areas taught in madrassas that aim at focusing a student’s
understanding around the Islamic religion. Teachings are divided up into the revealed and
rational sciences. Revealed sciences include the study of the Qur'an, Hadith, Qur’anic
commentary, and Islamic jurisprudence (Haqqani). Rational sciences includes the study of the
Arabic language and grammar to help understand the Qur'an, logic, rhetoric, and philosophy
(Haqqani). Curriculum has a balanced emphasis on learning Arabic and Persian. Arabic is
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deemed necessary to follow the original Islamic sources, and Persian is seen as necessary for
statecraft (Hoodbhoy 223).
The majority of madrassas in Muslim South Asia teach a curriculum known as Dars-iNizami which was created in the eighteenth century. The Dars-i-Nizami curriculum has been
“expunged by the more fundamentalist” (Hoodbhoy 223) beliefs. Deobandi thought has had the
greatest influence in effecting the development of the Dars-i-Nizami curriculum. The complete
Dars-i-Nizami curriculum runs from seven to nine years after the completion at the elementary
level.
A madrassas private education offers free tuition, room and board contrary to public
education which can be expensive for a family that wished to send their child to school. This
madrassa system is traditionally supported by the community through Zakat contributions
(Ahmad).
16

“The vast majority of [madrassas] in Pakistan are associated with one of five wafaq”

and “each wafaq represents one of five masalik” (Fair 56). The Maslak being referred to in this
sentence is Sunni-Hanafi-Deobandi. For a detailed breakdown of the organization of madrassas
in Pakistan please see Appendix M.
17

Deobandi is widely practiced in Pakistan. The interpretation of Islam arose in response

to British colonial rule in India. Derived from the Sunni tradition of Islam, followers are not
strictly Sunni. Deoband is a town about 100 miles away from Delhi, India. While the Deobandi
Tradition is much older, in 1867 a madrassa, named Dar-Ul-Ulum, was formed in the town
Deoband. The madrassa brought together “Muslims who were hostile to British rule and
committed to a literal and austere interpretation if Islam” (Global Security). The Deobandi
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school of thought has long sought to purify Islam by discarding supposedly un-Islamic accretions
to the faith and reemphasizing the models established in the Qur’an and the customary practices
of the Prophet Mohammed.
The Deobandi school of Islamic thinking believes that the reason why Islamic civilization
has fallen behind western civilizations is because Islamic civilization have been seduced and
corrupted by the West. Islam has stayed away from the “original pristine teaching of the prophet”
(Global Security). There are three facets to the Deobandi Islamic tradition. Firstly, the Deobandi
interpretation of Islam holds that a Muslims first loyalty is to their religion and secondarily to the
state in which they are a citizen. Secondly, a Muslim follower can only recognize the religious
frontiers of their ummah and not the national frontiers. Thirdly, Muslims have a sacred right and
obligation to go to any country and wage jihad to protect the Muslims of that country.
The fundamentalist appeal of Deobandi inspired the Taliban movement. Most of the
Taliban leadership was educated in Deobandi-influenced madrassas. Deobandi madrassas follow
the Nizami Standard. For example, the Taliban shares similar views on the treatment of women,
wariness of Western civilization and regarding Pakistan’s minority Shi’a as non-Muslim (Global
Security). According to the Taliban’s version of Deobandi the adoption of local customs has lead
to the dilution of the original laws laid down by the prophet. The Taliban places great emphasis
on the Umma. A Muslim in Pakistan is the same as a Muslim in Afghanistan and the Umma
should be defended in areas where they are the minority often leading to jihad to establish
pristine Islam.
Gulf countries, like Saudi Arabia, who have propelled a Wahhabi worldview, have
increasingly “co-opted the Deobandi movement in South Asia” (Global Security). Wahhabi
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supporters have found similarities between Wahhabi and Deobandi traditions that have directing
them to sustaining Deobandi influence.
18

Please see Appendix F for a profile on Mullah Mohammad Omar

19

Kandahar is the second largest city in Afghanistan.

20

Senator Hank Brown was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs at the time of this comment.
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As of December 2008, according to the International Council on Security and

Development (ICOS), the Taliban has an estimated “presence” of “72%” in Afghanistan. For an
enemy previously believed to be terminated, the Taliban is proving to be resilient against ISAF.
A large part of their comeback has been due to the connection between the Taliban and
madrassas in Pakistan.
22

Please see Appendix G for a map of Taliban presences and strongholds along the

Afghan-Pakistan border
23
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Shura in Arabic means “consultation.”
There is limited consensus in Pakistan on how to deal with the Taliban. Several

fractions dominate politics in Pakistan and most have different views of the situation. The
civilian government tends to be opposed to the Taliban and in favor of measurements to halt their
advancements in Pakistan. Another major player in Pakistani politics is the military and it has
traditionally has been inconsistent over its support for the Taliban. Most recently the military has
been opposed to the Taliban’s participation in Pakistan. A third important fraction is the InterService Intelligence (ISI) and the organization has been a strong supporter of the Taliban.
However, ISI has a stronger alliance with the military and is more likely to choose the military
over the Taliban. Lack of consensus on how to deal with the Taliban among the different
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fractions throughout Pakistan has allowed for the furthering of the problematic connection
between the Taliban and madrassas.
25

The areas identified of particular concern were the “Deobandi-controlled madrassas in

the [FATA],” “Northern Balochistan” madrassas, and “Dawa schools run by Jamat-ud-Dawa”25
as the main areas of specific distress (United States Department of State).
26

There some unofficial figures that estimate the number of madrassas around 40,000.

27

A Mullah is a Muslim man educated in Islamic theology and sacred law. It is the name

given to local Islamic clerics or mosque leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many members of
the Taliban hold the title of Mullah. One example is Mullah Mohammed Omar.
28

One observer recounted a visit to a madrassa where the students were taught,
that the world was divided into believers and unbelievers in a black
and white setting. Jews, Hindus and Christians were portrayed as
evil up risers. The curriculum started to emphasize the need for
Islamic warriors or jihadis to ‘liberate’ regions dominated by
unbelievers as well as ‘purify’ Islamic nations in order to establish
a single Islamic caliphate where pure Islam would be followed
(Kapisthalam).

29

An interview conducted by Imtiaz Ali, of the Jamestown Foundation, with Maulana

sami ul-Haq is one such example. Ali asked “There were reports that the Taliban leadership had
called for fresh reinforcements in connection with its spring offensive in Afghanistan. Is this
true?” In response Maulana sami ul-Haq said:
These are just baseless reports. Had they called upon the madrassa
students, they would have called us for the reinforcements or at
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least we would know. The Taliban are not that organized. They are
living in caves. They lack proper communication and logistics
systems, and that is why they do not want new recruits. The
Afghans themselves have risen up and they are fighting against
American and NATO forces (Ali).
30

Author Hussain Haqqani writes about an account he had with a student in a madrassa. He

discloses:
In a basement room with plasterless walls adorned by a clock
inscribed with ‘God is Great’ in Arabic, 9-year old Mohammed
Tahir rocked back and forth and recited the same versus of the
same verse of the Qur’an that had been instilled into my memory at
the same age: ‘Of all the communities raised among men you are
the best, enjoying the good, forbidding the wrong, and believing in
God.’ But when I asked him to explain how he understood the
passage, Tahir’s interpretation was quite different from the quietist
version taught to me. ‘The Muslim community of believers is the
best in the eyes of God, and we must make it the same in the eyes
of men by force,’ he said. ‘We must fight the unbelievers and that
includes those who carry Muslim names but have adopted the ways
of unbelievers. When I grow up I intend to carry out jihad in every
possible way (Haqqani 60).
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Haqqani also elaborates that “Tahir does not believe that al Qaeda is responsible for September
11 because his teacher told him that the attacks were a conspiracy by Jews against the Taliban”
and Tahir “considers Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden great Muslims, ‘for challenging the
might of the unbelievers” (Haqqani 60).
31

Please see Appendix H and I for two tables of comparative student and teachers

opinions between all the educational groups in Pakistan.
32

The city of Khost is located on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan where many of

the Taliban controlled madrassas are located.
33

Haqqani Network is an independent insurgent group in Afghanistan and Pakistan that

is closely allied with the Taliban. The group is led by Jalaluddin Haqqani. Haqqani, during the
Taliban’s years in power, served as the Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs and governor of
the Paktia Province. In 2001 he was named the Taliban’s military commander.
34

ISI began funding and teaching military training at madrassa in an effort to help with

Pakistan’s problem with India. Others also believe, like author Jones, “by the end of 1990s”
when “the Taliban had established control over most of [Afghanistan]” they “received strong
backing from Pakistan’s Directorate of [ISI], which assisted in the recruitment of members, and
providing weapons, training, and technical assistance” (Jones 19).
35

An example of this behavior from ISI has been tipping off Taliban forces about the

location and movement of coalition forces, which undermine many anti-Taliban militant
operations.
36

A study conducted on civil wars and insurgencies between 1945 and 1999 by James

Fearon and David Latin concluded, “that financially, organizationally, and politically weak
central government rendered insurgencies more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing
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or inept counterinsurgency practices” (Jones 15). Another study conducted by Michael Doyle
and Nicholas Sambanis of 151 cases over a 50 year period “found that effective governance is
critical to ending civil wars” (Doyle 5). This study also argued that success “requires the
provision of temporary security, the building of new institutions capable of resolving future
conflict peacefully, and an economy capable of offering civilian employment to former soldiers
and material progress to future soldiers” (Doyle 5) which is a lot along what the Taliban is trying
to do for the youth coming out of madrassas. Many in Afghanistan still remember that the
Taliban was able to succeed in establishing law and order throughout most of the country.
37

Two separate public opinion poll conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2004 and 2006

found that Afghans were most concerned about governance failures (Jones). Poor governance
increases the likelihood of an insurgency because the state’s security forces lack legitimacy and
are unable to establish law and order.
38

A societal man refers the average person in Afghanistan and Pakistan who is typically

less educated versus a student who receives an education in a madrassa.
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